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Abstract: 
In 1990 the US Federal Emergency Management Agency created the Community 
Ratings System (CRS) to engage local governments to enhance community flood 
resilience. CRS encourages community flood risk management activities by 
discounting flood insurance premiums commensurate with the level of flood 
management measures implemented. Using a national sample of communities, 
this study empirically identifies factors motivating both communities’ decision to 
participate and intensity of participation in CRS.  The results indicate that local 
capacity, flood risk factors, socio-economic characteristics, and political economy 
factors are significant predictors of CRS participation. Further, factors predicting 
participation in CRS differ from factors predicting CRS scores.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Water disaster management in the United States (US), and flood disaster management in 
particular, generally involves both local and national-level policies and institutions.  Much can 
be learned from analyzing the US experience with improving its flood disaster management.  
Historically, the US has suffered considerable losses, both in terms of lives lost and property 
damage, to flooding events. For example, the 30-year average for flood-related deaths and flood 
damage from 1982 to 2011 are 95 fatalities and $8.20 billion, respectively (National Weather 
Services [NWS], 2013). The devastation caused by flooding is also reflected in Presidential 
Disaster Declarations, where over 80 percent of presidentially declared disaster losses are 
engendered by flooding (Landry & Li, 2012). As a result of persistent increases in flood losses 
and the unavailability of private flood insurance (Federal Emergency Management Agency 
[FEMA], 2011), the federal government passed the National Flood Insurance Act (NFIA) in 
1968, which established the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). One of the goals of NFIP 
is to reduce future flood losses by encouraging communities to adopt and enforce floodplain 
management ordinances in exchange for federally backed flood insurance (FEMA, 2011). As of 
December 2011, approximately 5.6 million residential and commercial insurance policies were 
in force, totaling $1.26 trillion in coverage (FEMA, 2013). Although the NFIP has been 
successful in providing support to flood victims, some argue that the NFIP subsidized insurance 
premiums may be encouraging more losses or development in high-risk areas (e.g., Thomas & 
Leichenko, 2011; Kousky & Kunreuther 2013; Goodwin, 2013). In order to reduce flood losses, 
which are still substantial (FEMA, 2013), in 1990, FEMA created the Community Ratings 
System (CRS) through the NFIP. CRS is a voluntary program that encourages communities to 
engage in additional flood risk management activities by offering communities discounted flood 
insurance premiums commensurate with the level of flood management measures implemented.  
The relatively new CRS marked a departure in using a federal program (NFIP) to directly 
engage local governments in integrating flood risk reduction into their plans and to enhance 
community flood resilience. Better understanding CRS performance promises to respond, in part, 
to two of the five research priority areas identified in Gopalakrishnan (2013): mainstreaming risk 
reduction policies and capacity building and resilience.  Although researchers have studied the 
factors that motivate communities to participate in CRS within single states (Brody, Zahran, 
Highfield, Bernhardt, & Vedlitz, 2009; Landry & Li, 2012), there is only one study to our 
knowledge on the factors that motivate communities to participate in CRS for a national sample. 
Previous research into the factors motivating participation in the CRS typically looked only at 
single state case studies and did not assess the “intensity” of participation as measured by the 
CRS scores. Results for particular state case studies may not generalize well to the nation as a 
whole.  We examine participation of cities, towns, villages, and townships across the nation.  
Further, participation and the intensity of participation are closely linked community decisions 
yet have different determinants.  As a result, this study attempts to empirically answer two 
questions: (1) what factors motivate communities to participate in CRS? (2) What factors predict 
CRS scores conditional on CRS participation? A good understanding of what factors motivate 
communities to not only participate in CRS, but also attain high CRS scores can help policy 
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makers to develop targeted policies to address flood risks and subsequently reduce flood losses. 
Using national data on historical CRS participation, the 1990 Census, financial data from the 
1992 Census of Governments, climate and topographical information from the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), and other data sources, we analyze the determinants of CRS 
participation and CRS scores. We estimate two basic empirical models: (1) a logit model to 
explain why some communities opt to participate and others do not; (2) a tobit model and a 
Cragg (double-hurdle) model to explain the CRS score achieved, given that the community 
participated.  We use these models to test several competing hypotheses – local government 
capacity, flood risk factors, socio-demographic factors, and political economy factors – that 
explain why communities participate as they do.  The results indicate that local capacity, flood 
risk factors, socio-demographic characteristics, and political economy factors are significant 
predictors of CRS participation. In addition, the results indicate that the factors that motivate 
communities to participate in CRS are not the same factors that predict CRS scores.  
After a brief background description of the NFIP and CRS, we present a review of 
relevant literature followed by a discussion of the methodological approach, including the dataset 
used to answer the research questions.  Next, we present our findings and discuss the results. 
Finally, we conclude with policy implications of our results and outline an agenda for future 
research on community flood risk mitigation. 
1.1 The National Flood Insurance Program 
The recognition of the potential consequences of flooding prompted the US federal government 
to initially engage in structural mitigation measures - levees, seawalls, dams, etc. - to control 
flooding and provide relief assistance to disaster victims (FEMA, 2011). However, this strategy 
was neither successful in reducing flood losses nor discouraging communities from building in 
flood-prone areas (Brody et al., 2010; FEMA, 2011). To make matters worse, the private market 
was not providing affordable flood insurance for water damage from flooding and other storms 
because of the seasonality of floods, uncertainty of flood risk, and high flood risk (Kunreuther, 
1996; FEMA, 2011; Kousky, Olmstead, Walls, Stern, & Macauley, 2011). Due to the increasing 
disaster losses and unavailability of insurance coverage from the private sector, on 1 August 
1968, the US Congress established the NFIP through the passage of NFIA, to provide flood 
insurance to communities. Communities can participate in the NFIP by adopting and enforcing 
floodplain management ordinances in exchange for federally backed flood insurance (FEMA, 
2011). 
In addition to providing flood insurance to communities, NFIP also develops Flood 
Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM), which depict the base flood elevations, flood zones, and 
floodplain boundaries of the nation’s communities. FIRMs help homeowners/renters and 
insurance companies identify flood risks (FEMA, 2002). Recognizing that buildings constructed 
prior to the adoption of FIRM were not likely to have known about flood risks, pre-FIRM 
buildings receive subsidized insurance rates. In exchange for subsidized insurance rates for pre-
FIRM buildings, communities are expected to protect new construction from floods by 
implementing floodplain management ordinances (FEMA, 2002).        
There have been several amendments to NFIP since its creation in 1968.  Realizing that 
communities were not participating in NFIP at high rates voluntarily, Congress added the 
Mandatory Flood Insurance Purchase Requirement in 1973. This amendment mandates “ … 
federally insured or regulated lenders … to require flood insurance on all grants and loans for 
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acquisition or construction of buildings in designated Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs) in 
communities that participate in the NFIP” (FEMA, 2002, p. 3). SFHA is a piece of land in a 
floodplain that has a 1 percent or greater chance of flooding in any given year (also known as the 
100-year flood occurrence) (FEMA, 2002). This 1973 requirement engendered an increase in the 
number of communities participating in NFIP from 2,200 in 1973 to 15,000 in 1977 (FEMA, 
2002). In 1994, the National Flood Insurance Reform Act (NFIRA) added additional measures to 
increase compliance of the mandatory purchase requirement, to codify the CRS, and to require 
FEMA to reassess the FIRMs every 5 years, among other measures (FEMA, 2002). More 
recently, the US Congress enacted the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform and 
Modernization Act of 2012. Changes made by this act include premium rate structure reforms, a 
requirement for FEMA to develop a reserve fund, and the development of an ongoing mapping 
program that will continuously update floodplain maps (National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, 2012). This 2012 act was in response to recent flood disasters in the US, like 
Hurricane Katrina and Super storm Sandy that resulted in billions of dollars in flood damage. In 
the aftermath of these disasters, it was clear that many individuals had not purchased flood 
insurance (King, 2013). As a matter of fact, only 18 percent of all Americans have flood 
insurance (Stellin, 2012). In addition, it seems that many people misunderstand their flood risk 
and often underestimate the probability that a flood could occur, thereby decreasing the 
likelihood that they will obtain the mandatory insurance coverage (King, 2013).       
 
[TABLE 1 HERE]  
 
1.2 The Community Rating System 
The CRS program, which was implemented in 1990, is supposed to give additional incentives to 
communities to go beyond the NFIP requirements to address flood risks. The program has three 
main objectives: reduce flood losses, strengthen accurate insurance ratings, and foster awareness 
of flood insurance (King, 2013). When communities participate in CRS, they not only reduce 
their flood risks they also enjoy discounted premiums (up to 45 percent) on federally required 
flood insurance based on their community’s CRS score (see Table 1). To date, over 1,200 
communities from all 50 states are participating voluntarily in the CRS program, achieving a 
wide range of ratings (FEMA, 2013). The 19 credited activities to be completed by communities 
fall into four major categories; public information activities, mapping and regulations, flood 
damage reduction activities, and warning and response (see Table 2). Public information 
activities promote the purchase of insurance, advise people about their flood hazards, and 
provide information on how to reduce risks. Mapping and regulation activities increase the 
protection to new development, while flood damage reduction activities address the risks present 
in current structures. Lastly, the warning and response activities are those that prepare 
communities to respond during flood events (FEMA, 2013).  
[TABLE 2 HERE]  
 
 
2. Literature Review 
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Improving flood disaster management policies involves better understanding current policy 
frameworks.  Since the creation of NFIP, researchers have studied various aspects of this 
program. For example, researchers have examined the problems and the potential of NFIP 
(Anderson, 1974), the proposed changes for the NFIP (United States General Accounting Office 
(GAO), 1983), and the demand for flood insurance (Browne & Hoyt, 2000). Others have looked 
at the participation in NFIP by coastal communities (Landry & Jahan-Parvar, 2011; Petrolia, 
Landry, & Coble, 2013) and flood risk perception in lands protected by 100-year levees (Ludy & 
Kondolf, 2012).  Similarly, researchers have studied different aspects of CRS. For instance, 
Brody et al. (2009) used the CRS as a case study to understand policy learning for flood 
mitigation. These researchers found that local jurisdictions do learn from histories of flood risks 
(Brody et al., 2009). In addition, Posey (2009) used the CRS as a proxy for adaptive capacity and 
examined whether the socio-economic status (SES) of individuals in a community is a 
determinant of adaptive capacity at the municipal level. Posey’s results suggest an association 
between average individual SES and adaptive capacity of the collective (i.e., participation in 
CRS) (Posey, 2009). In addition, Zahran, Weiler, Brody, and Lindell (2009) examined the 
correlation between flood insurance purchases by households and the flood mitigation measures 
implemented by local governments participating in CRS in Florida. Their results indicate a 
strong correlation between household flood insurance purchase and local government mitigation 
activities. Furthermore, Zahran, Brody, Highfield, and Vedlitz (2010) studied the relationship 
between the non-linear nature of the incentive inherent in CRS and observed changes in CRS 
scores. Their results indicate that adoption of mitigation measures by Florida communities are 
driven by the non-linear incentive nature of CRS. Finally, Landry and Li (2012) studied the 
influence of local capacity, hydrological risk factors, and flood experience on community hazard 
mitigation decisions in North Carolina counties (participation in CRS was used as a measure of 
community hazard mitigation decisions). Landry and Li’s (2012) results suggest positive 
relationships between flood history and CRS participation, as well as between physical risk 
factors and CRS participation, among other findings. 
Researchers have measured local capacity in terms of resource availability, such as the 
number of trained staff in a community (Kunreuther & Roth, 1998). Previous studies on risk 
reduction have established a positive relationship between resources (time, money, man-power, 
etc.) and adoption of risk-reducing measures at the household (Mileti, 1999), community (May & 
Birkland, 1994; Brody et al., 2010), and organizational levels (Mileti, Darlington, Fitzpatrick, & 
O’Brien, 1993; Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997; Meyer-Emerick & Momen, 2003; Sadiq, 2010). In 
the light of these findings, we expect a positive relationship between local capacity (e.g., payroll, 
property tax revenue, and capital outlay) and participation in CRS.  
Prior studies have measured community flood risk in several different ways depending on 
data availability. For example, Posey (2009) measured flood risk by the number of flood 
insurance policies, the amount of payments made to satisfy flood claims, and flood insurance 
claims filed; while Zahran et al. (2010) measure flood risk by flood frequency and flood property 
damage. According to the findings of these studies and others, communities that faced higher 
flood risks are more likely to undertake flood mitigation measures (Posey, 2009; Zahran et al., 
2010; Landry & Li, 2012). As a result, we expect a positive relationship between flood risk 
factors (e.g., percent of community area covered by water, topography, and humidity) and 
participation in CRS.  
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In addition, researchers have found significant relationships between socio-demographic 
factors - educational level, percentage of senior citizens in a community, population density - and 
local flood risk mitigation (Zahran et al., 2010; Landry & Li, 2012). Based on these studies, we 
expect a significant relationship between socio-demographic factors (e.g., educational 
attainment, racial composition, share of residents who are children) and CRS participation. 
Landry and Li (2012) argue that wealthier communities (measured as median household 
income or housing values) may put less pressure on local government to adopt flood mitigation 
measures because they themselves undertake personal protective measures against flood. 
Rentership rates and the share of new residents (who likely have new mortgages governed by 
NFIP mandates) are also linked to local collective action.  We expect a significant relationship 
between political economy factors (e.g., housing values, share of housing units that are rentals, 
household income, and turnover rates) and CRS participation. 
Only one of these prior NFIP and CRS studies looks at the predictors of CRS 
participation using national scale data. By examining the factors that motivate communities to 
participate voluntarily in CRS using national data, we hope to produce generalizable results. In 
addition, none of the aforementioned studies has examined whether or not the determinants of 
CRS participation are the same as the determinants of CRS scores. Based on our literature review 
and the need to contribute to this important, but scanty literature on CRS participation 
specifically and the study of risks in general, we posit the following hypotheses: 
 
2.1 Hypotheses 
• H1: Local capacity: communities with more financial resources (e.g., payroll, property 
tax revenue, and capital outlay) are more likely than communities with less financial 
resources to participate in CRS and score higher CRS scores ceteris paribus. 
• H2: Flood risk factors: communities with higher flood risks (e.g., percent of community 
area covered by water, topography, and humidity) are more likely than communities with 
lower flood risks to participate in CRS and score higher CRS scores ceteris paribus.  
• H3: Socio-demographic factors: the likelihood and intensity of a community’s 
participation in CRS is influenced by socio-demographic characteristics (e.g., educational 
level, racial composition, and share of residents who are children). 
• H4: Political-economy factors: the likelihood and intensity of a community’s 
participation in the CRS depends on expected capitalization gains (e.g., housing values 
and share of housing units that are rentals) and residents’ ability to influence local 
policies (e.g., household income and turnover rates). 
 
3. Methodology  
 
3.1 Data 
 
We combined five data sources to inform the analysis. Data on CRS participation is obtained 
from the 2013 CRS Coordinator’s Manual (FEMA, 2013) and FEMA. Underlying flood risk 
data from US Department of Transportation (US DOT) (1996) offers very high resolution (1 km 
grid cell) rankings of flood risk (on a 0-100 scale) that use underlying topography and 
hydrography of the area.  This flood hazard rank variable derives from a formula that equally 
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weights annual flooding frequency ranked from 0-100 (which itself is an area-weighted average 
of flooding by soil map units within the 1km grid cell) and their potential scour depth ranked 
from 0-100.  Scour depth reflects erosion hazard based on 100-year flood flow, sediment size, 
and stream shape characteristics (Williams, Carreon, & Bradley, 1992).  Thus this flood hazard 
risk variable captures both the frequency and the intensity of flooding.  This flood risk measure 
has three advantages: (i) it derives from data and computations that largely predate the start of 
the CRS program, (ii) it offers a rich quantitative scale for flood risk, and (iii) it provides spatial 
resolution much smaller than cities or counties, which allows better distributional 
characterization of flood risk (see footnote 2).  The Natural Amenities Index, which contains data 
on the physical characteristics of counties like topography, climate, and water coverage, are 
taken from USDA’s Economic Research Service. Information about the population and housing 
stock of communities is obtained from 1990 block-group level Census data from United States 
Census Bureau. Finally, information about government expenditures and revenues is taken from 
the 1992 Census of Governments, the earliest available Census data on local governments’ 
finances.   
The unit of analysis for this study is a Census place, which includes cities, towns, 
townships or other Census-designated places (henceforth referred to as “places”), which captures 
roughly half of the CRS-participating communities.  While the CRS invites participation from 
“communities” – which includes both counties and incorporated cities and towns – the analysis 
here is restricted to places.  About 4% of the 28,000-plus places in the US participate in the CRS.  
For some data available at the county level, each place can be associated with a host county by 
the United States Census Bureau (1990).  This, coupled with the use of more spatially refined 
Census data from 1990 (i.e., block groups), enables the exploration of the broader distribution of 
socio-economic variables within a community (rather than relying on simple means or medians 
at the larger place-level).  It is both possible and likely that place-average values of predictors 
like property values or flood risk will perform less well than peak values within the place.   
All variables are taken from 1990, or as close to that year as possible, in order to better 
match the variables to the conditions existing before the start of the CRS program with those 
after, thereby enabling a causal interpretation to the findings.  There is a serious concern that, for 
a CRS program that began in 1990, that the program’s operation has indeed had an impact on a 
host of participating places’ characteristics.  An effective CRS would affect flood insurance 
policies, claims and flood damages, and even migration and development patterns.  Accordingly, 
relatively permanent or preexisting measures of local capacity, flood risks, socio-economic and 
political factors are employed in order to minimize their endogeneity in models predicting 
current CRS participation.  A consequence of this cautious approach that predicts current 
participation with “deep lags” of explanatory variables is reduced explanatory power.  
Significant effects in this model should be interpreted as less proximate causes of CRS 
participation, but rather as more indirect forces that affect participation perhaps through 
intermediate mechanisms (e.g., wealthier communities can better afford to start and sustain 
engaging a federal program).  Of course, recent shocks like floods likely drive reactionary 
participation (Zahran et al., 2010).  The influence of more permanent flood risks are captured 
here without including endogenous post-1990 measures like experienced flood damages or those 
related to flood insurance maps, policies, or claims – all of which partly result from a 
community’s flood mitigation activities (such as CRS participation). 
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3.2 Variables 
 
Table 3 shows the dependent and independent variables and their descriptions. The dependent 
variable for the logit model is CRS participation and the dependent variable for the tobit model 
and the Cragg - double hurdle model (“craggit”) (Cragg, 1971) is the total CRS scores for the 
communities that were participating in CRS at of 2012.  
 
[TABLE 3 HERE]  
 
3.3 Data analysis 
 
We employ a two-stage nested model. For the participation model, we use a logit model to 
explain why some communities participate and others do not. Logit is an appropriate model 
because of the binary nature of the dependent variable. Linear probability models would yield 
heteroskedastic error term (Wooldridge, 2002).  
 
[TABLE 4 HERE]  
 
To understand the predictors of CRS score conditional on participation, we use both a tobit 
model and a craggit model. The two-stage Cragg model offers a compelling alternative to a tobit 
model in this context because the tobit restricts the underlying process or parameters to be the 
same in determining both participation (in the first stage) and actual score (in the second stage). 
The craggit, which is a more flexible model than Tobit, allows for distinct processes to determine 
the participation and the score separately.  Cragg’s alternative uses a probit for the first stage and 
a truncated normal for the second. As the tobit model is nested in the craggit model, the Cragg 
approach is preferred and offers both interesting comparisons with the tobit and a useful 
demonstration of the value in relaxing some tobit’s assumptions. The descriptive statistics for the 
independent and dependent variables are presented in Table 4. 
 
4. Results 
 
Table 4 shows that 4.2 percent of all communities are participating in CRS as of 2012. This 
means that out of a total of 28,147 communities, 1,182 communities were participating in CRS 
as at 2012. For this group of participants, the minimum CRS score obtained is 505 (CRS class 9) 
and the maximum CRS score obtained is 5,315 (CRS class 1). In other to determine whether 
there are significant differences between the means of all independent variables for participant 
and non-participant communities, we run a t-test. The t-test results indicate that there are 
statistically significant differences (p < 0.01) between the two groups on all but three 
independent variables—humidity, plains, and the interaction between humidity and topography.  
 The logistic model is estimated using STATA statistical analysis software. Table 5 
shows the results of the logistic regression. The pseudo R-square of 41.07 percent indicates a 
good fit of the logistic regression.  
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[TABLE 5 HERE]  
 
 The result from the logistic regression indicates that local capacity factors are significant 
predictors of CRS participation. Specifically, the result indicates a positive significant 
relationship between payroll and CRS participation. The result also shows a significant, but 
negative relationship between property tax revenue and CRS participation. Capital outlay is not a 
significant predictor of CRS participation. 
Flood risk factors in a community are significant determinants of CRS participation. 
Measures from the ERS’s Natural Amenities Index which capture climate and topography, and 
their interaction, play some role.  Specifically, the percent of community area covered by water 
and humidity both significantly increase CRS participation. As expected, interaction terms 
(highly variable topography and extensive surface water, highly variable topography and more 
humidity) are negative and significant determinants of CRS participation as communities are less 
likely to participate in the CRS in steeper or mountainous topography. More water and flatter 
topography is typically associated with floodplains and more flooding risk, and the results for the 
interaction terms in Table 5 are consistent with the notion that greater flood risk is associated 
with CRS participation.  Finally, conditional on those basic correlates of flood risk, peak flood 
risk in the area is also a positive significant determinant of CRS participation.1  That basic, 
county-level climate and topography factors play a significant role even after directly controlling 
for flooding risk suggests other environmental conditions beyond technical flood risk measures 
can influence community mitigation. 
Two out of the three socio-demographic factors are significant predictors of CRS 
participation. Share of population that is white and the share of population under the age of 18, 
both significantly decrease CRS participation. Share of population with a college degree is not a 
significant predictor of CRS participation. 
Political-economy factors are significant predictors of CRS participation. Housing values 
are significant positive predictors of CRS participation, consistent with greater private gains to 
homeowners from discounted flood insurance. The share of housing units that are rentals 
significantly decreases CRS participation, as would be expected if renters apply less pressure on 
community flood risk managers. Conversely, household income and share of residents not 
relocating significantly decrease CRS participation rates.  
We employed a tobit regression to determine the factors that predict the credits or scores 
that communities get conditional on participating in the CRS program. Because we cannot 
interpret the tobit coefficients as effect sizes for actual CRS scores, we focus on the significance 
and direction of the coefficients. The tobit result suggests positive and significant association 
between CRS scores and payroll, capital outlay on related categories, housing values, 
educational attainment, humidity, topography, the percent of a community area covered by 
1 As an important aside, given that flood risk (measured at the 1km × 1km grid cell scale) often varies widely within 
a community, it is interesting to note that the “max-mean” function performed most consistently in the model runs.  
The grid cell risks can be aggregated to a block-group level (e.g., mean risk, maximum risk) and those neighborhood 
level risk indicators can be aggregated up to a county level.  Taking the highest value among neighborhood risk 
levels, where neighborhood risk is defined as the average risk in that neighborhood, proved a strong fit in these 
models. 
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water, the interaction between humidity and plains, and community flood risk. The tobit results 
also show a negative and significant association between CRS scores and amount of property 
tax, household income, share of renters and share of residents not relocating, share of population 
not finishing high school, share of a community’s population that is White, share of population 
under the age of 18, and ruralness. In addition, plains, the interaction between the percent of a 
community area covered by water and topography, and the interaction between humidity and 
topography, all decrease CRS scores.  
We employ a Cragg model, which relaxes some tobit assumptions, to better understand 
whether the factors that motivate communities to participate in CRS are the same factors that 
determine the CRS scores for communities. The Cragg model results indicate that the factors that 
influence communities’ decision to participate in CRS do not operate similarly in influencing 
communities’ CRS scores. The predictors of CRS participation are indeed different than those 
determining the intensity of participation.  Payroll, household income, share of renters, share of 
population not finishing high school, share of population that is White, share of population under 
the age of 18, humidity, topography, plains, percent of community area covered by water, and 
flood risk are significant determinants of CRS participation but are not significant predictors of 
CRS score. Additionally, all three interaction terms that significantly predict CRS participation - 
the percent of a community area covered by water and topography, humidity and plains, and 
humidity and topography – are not significant predictor of CRS score. 
 
[TABLE 6 HERE]  
 
5. Discussion 
 
The size of the government staff does appear to be positively associated with government 
capacity to participate in the CRS program, but property tax revenues do not also work in this 
way. Capital outlay on flood-related infrastructure categories, conversely, is positively associated 
with CRS participation (in the tobit and craggit models) and likely reflects local capacity or 
interest in flood risk management. We expect higher property tax revenues to lead to more 
participation in CRS. Contrary to our expectations, the results from each model indicate a 
negative and significant relationship between property tax revenue and CRS participation. This 
finding is at odds with Landry and Li’s (2012) finding of a positive relationship between CRS 
participation and property tax revenue. One possible explanation for this negative relationship is 
that many places’ inability to collect property taxes biases its effects in this sample (unlike 
Landry and Li (2012), who only analyze counties). Another explanation is that, conditional on 
payroll and housing values, property tax revenues may better capture the effect of higher tax 
rates. Finally, it might be that the property tax revenue effect may be proxying for larger 
communities. Alternative constructions of the property tax variable merit investigations, 
including a per-household measure (which would better align with Landry and Li’s usage) and 
one that addressed potential nonlinearities (where logging is not an option because, unlike 
Landry and Li (2012) who study North Carolina counties, many places report $0 in property tax 
receipts). Unlike an analysis for counties, property tax receipts are not as good a candidate for 
measuring capacity to participate in CRS as the size of the government’s payroll and its capital 
outlays for water- and sewerage-related infrastructure.  That latter, in particular, is a strong and 
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consistent predictor of both participation in CRS and attainment of higher CRS scores.  In sum, 
the negative sign on the coefficient of property tax does not support H1, but the significant and 
positive sign on the coefficients for payroll and FlowCapital does support H1.  
With regard to flood risk factors, the positive signs on the coefficients of these three 
variables – percent of community area covered by water, topography, and humidity – indicate 
support for H2. In other words, communities with higher flood risks are more likely to 
participate in CRS. A higher percentage of water coverage indicates a higher likelihood of 
flooding. More humidity, especially in flatter topography, is a strong predictor of participation.  
These findings are generally consistent with the expectation that combining water flows with flat 
areas leads to more flooding.  That climate and topography measures matter so much in this 
model is particularly interesting in light of the control for a more technical “flood risk” measure. 
This result is in line with previous research (Landry and Li 2012) and an important finding to 
policy makers because it suggests that flood hazard mitigation measures are implemented by 
communities that are prone to flooding (Landry and Li 2012).  It is also important to recognize 
that communities appear to be influenced by natural characteristics of their environments beyond 
what technical flood risk metrics capture.  
More than government capacity and natural risk drive CRS participation, however.  The 
results also present evidence in support of H3 and H4.  Socio-demographic factors like racial 
composition, education levels, and age profiles play important roles in explaining CRS 
participation.  Furthermore, political and economic variables explain a great deal of the variation 
in CRS participation, although not always as expected.  Specifically, household income is a 
significant negative predictor of CRS participation - communities with higher household 
incomes are less likely than communities with lower household incomes to participate in CRS. 
One explanation is that residents of wealthier places are better able to invest in personal flood 
mitigation measures and may not see the need to demand that their communities participate in 
CRS.  An alternative explanation is that measures of average income for the region may not be 
the appropriate income metric and may even be inversely related to the relevant group’s income.  
Income variability among suburban communities appears to play an important role here.   
Just as flood risk positively predicting CRS participation is taken to indicate some 
validity to the overall results, the positive relationship between property values and CRS 
participation is vital to a political economy approach to understanding CRS.  (As flood insurance 
premiums are proportional to housing value, the benefits from the CRS discounting rise in 
property values.)  Similarly, a greater share of renters is seen to deter participation, something 
consistent with a Home Voter hypothesis (Fischel, 2001).  Newer housing construction and high 
turnover rates among residents predicts greater and more intense participation in CRS, 
suggesting that expanding (and perhaps sprawling) communities are most apt to see value in 
CRS.  New homes and recent sales fall under the NFIP purview, making them more likely to 
have mandatory flood insurance and thus raising the value of CRS participation to communities 
with more of those residents.  Interestingly, these factors associated with private gains to 
homeowners predict CRS participation but appear unrelated to CRS scores attained.  Higher 
housing values, surprisingly, predict lower CRS scores (and thus lower insurance premium 
discounts) conditional upon participating at all. The negative role of wealth, even conditional on 
all the other controls like housing value and education levels, still presents some anomalous 
results. 
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It is interesting to note that the factors that motivate communities to participate in the 
CRS program are generally not the same factors that determine what CRS scores communities 
that participate in CRS get. For example, flood risk is a significant predictor of CRS participation 
but is not a significant predictor of the CRS scores attained by communities. Further, greater 
property values appear to reduce CRS score achievement rather than increase it.  The 
communities that score highest in the CRS program are a special kind of participating 
communities, that much is clear. Knowing the specific predictors for CRS participation and CRS 
scores would be useful to policy makers – it might enable them to develop policies that would 
incentivize communities who are already participating in CRS to attain higher CRS scores. Such 
incentives should target flood reducing measures that would contribute immensely to reducing 
community vulnerability to flooding.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The US suffers huge losses from flooding, both in terms of lives lost and property damage, every 
year (Gopalakrishnan, 2013). The recognition of persistent losses and the absence of private 
flood insurance prompted the US federal government to establish the NFIP in 1968. In 1990, the 
US federal government established, as part of the NFIP, the Community Ratings System, which 
is a voluntary program aimed at reducing community flood losses and making communities more 
resilient to flood disasters. Previous research into the factors motivating participation in the CRS 
typically looked only at single state case studies and did not assess the “intensity” of 
participation as measured by the CRS scores. We use national data to understand the factors that 
motivate communities to participate in CRS. In addition, we examined the factors that predict a 
first stage of CRS participation and a second stage of CRS scores using several approaches. The 
results indicate that local capacity, flood risk factors, socio-demographic characteristics, and 
political and economic factors are significant predictors of CRS participation. In addition, the 
results indicate that the factors that motivate communities to participate in CRS are not the same 
factors that predict CRS scores.  
 This national level analysis offers an opportunity to generalize our findings; something 
that has not been done enough by previous studies.  Nevertheless, there are some limitations of 
the current study. First, there are some independent variables that previous studies argue are 
important predictors of CRS participation that are not in our study. For instance, flood 
experience and percentage of senior citizens (Landry & Li, 2012), population density, reduction 
per policy holder, and flood property damage (Brody et al., 2009). Second, using total CRS score 
as our dependent variable does not allow us to see the predictor for each of the four groups of 
scoring activities (i.e., Series 300, 400, 500, and 600). Finally, our models characterize the 
participation decisions in a cross-sectional setting; it does not model the dynamics of when 
communities opt to participate or drop out of the CRS program.  Assessing these changes over 
time remains the focus of future research, especially in light of new local flood risk information.  
 Despite these limitations, this study contributes to the literature on NFIP and CRS in 
particular and natural hazard risk reduction in general. We urge researchers to take this national 
level study a step further by exploring some additional hypotheses about local flood risk map 
changes, social capital and political activism, and learning from neighboring communities. In 
addition, decomposing total CRS scores to determine whether different factors motivate 
communities to focus on some types of activities more than others, can shed light on program 
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efficacy, as well as feasibility of alternative risk management strategies. For example, it would 
be interesting to know whether high flood-risk communities focus on Series 300 (informational 
items) more than Series 500 (mostly structural measures).  
The results of this study shine light on the drivers that motivate public authorities to 
engage in community risk management for flooding.  This is especially important as flood risks 
and flood induced losses continue to rise. As one of the criticisms of NFIP is that it subsidizes 
building in floodplains (Goodwin, 2013) and thus exacerbates these losses. The CRS program is 
especially fascinating as it encourages voluntary community-scale flood risk management by 
further discounting the flood insurance premiums. With most CRS points earned for 
informational activities or those that do not actually reduce flood risks, that higher-risk 
communities tend to participate in the CRS and enjoy discounted premiums raises important 
questions about the sustainability and efficiency of the program. Understanding how to better 
promote community-wide risk management and public mitigation efforts remains a major policy 
challenge for natural disaster risks in general (Gopalakrishnan, 2013). It is our hope that this 
study will help to galvanize support for increased attention to water disasters as well as spur 
interest in empirical research to inform water policy to make communities more resilient to water 
disasters.  
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Table 1. CRS classes, credit points, and premium discounts based on location in or outside 
Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA). 
CRS Class Credit Points Premium Reduction 
In SFHA (%) Outside SFHA (%) 
1 4,500+ 45 10 
2 4,000-4,999 40 10 
3 3,500-3,999 35 10 
4 3,000-3,499 30 10 
5 2,500-2,999 25 10 
6 2,000-2,499 20 10 
7 1,500-1,999 15 5 
8 1,000-1,499 10 5 
9 500-999 5 5 
10 0-499 0 0 
Note:  Extracted from FEMA (2013). National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System Coordinator’s 
Manual.  http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1557-20490-
9922/crs_manual_508_ok_5_10_13_bookmarked.pdf.   
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Table 2. Credit points awarded for CRS activities. 
Activity Maximum Possible 
Points 
Percent of Communities 
Crediteda 
300 Public Information Activities   
   310 Elevation Certificates 116 100% 
   320 Map Information Service 90 93 
   330 Outreach Projects 360 90 
   340 Hazard Disclosure 80 68 
   350 Flood Protection Information 125 92 
   360 Flood Protection Assistance 110 41 
   370 Flood Insurance Promotion 110 0 
400 Mapping and Regulations   
   410 Floodplain Mapping 802 50% 
   420 Open Space Preservation 2,020 68 
   430 Higher Regulatory Standards 2,042 98 
   440 Flood Data Maintenance 222 87 
   450 Stormwater Management 755 83 
500 Flood Damage Reduction Activities   
   510 Floodplain Mgmt. Planning 622 43% 
   520 Acquisition and Relocation 1,900 23 
   530 Flood Protection 1,600 11 
   540 Drainage System Maintenance 570 78 
600 Warning and Response   
   610 Flood Warning and Response 395 37% 
   620 Levees 235 0 
   630 Dams 160 0 
Note:  a Includes communities credited partially 
Extracted from FEMA (2013). National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System Coordinator’s 
Manual.  http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1557-20490-
9922/crs_manual_508_ok_5_10_13_bookmarked.pdf.  
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Table 3. Variable and their descriptions 
Variable Description 
Dependent variables  
1. Participation in CRS 
 
 
2. Total CRS score  
 
Communities that were participating in CRS as of 2012 
(Dichotomous: 1 for communities currently participating in CRS 
and 0 for communities not currently participating in CRS.) 
Total CRS score obtained by each participating community (i.e., 
the sum of points obtained from the 19 credited activities in 
Series 300, 400, 500, and 600 sections of the CRS scoring 
formula.) 
Independent Variables  
ln(payroll)  Log of total payroll ($) for each community, 1992 
PropTax Total property tax revenue for each community, 1992 
FlowCapital Sum of annual capital outlay ($) on sewerage, solid waste 
management, and water transport and terminals, 1992 
HousingValue ln(county’s median block-group median housing value, 1990) 
HHincome ln(county’s median block-group median income, 1990)  
YearBuilt Mean of county’s block group’s median year housing built, 1990 
RentShare Mean of county’s block group’s share of housing units as 
rentals, 1990 
StayShare Mean of county’s block group’s share of households living in 
same home five years earlier, 1990 
CollegeShare Mean of county’s block group’s share with college degrees, 
1990 
noHSshare Mean of county’s block group’s share not finishing high school, 
1990 
WhiteShare Mean of county’s block group’s share that is white, 1990 
ChildShare Mean of county’s block group’s population share under age 18, 
1990 
Ruralness Rural-urban continuum code from ERS (scales from 1 – 9, with 
1 indicating counties in metro areas over 1 million population 
and 9 indicating completely rural counties with less than 2,500 
population and no adjacent metro area) 
Humidity Average relative humidity in July 
Topography Topography code from ERS (scales from 1 for flat plains to 21 
for high mountains). 
Plains Dummy variable (from Topography) indicating flat, smooth or 
irregular plains 
WaterShare Percent of county area covered by water 
WaterTopo WaterShare × Topography 
WetPlains Humidity × Plains 
WetTopo Humidity × Topography 
Floodrisk Mean flood risk of block group with highest mean risk in county 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean (CRS)a 
Participation in 
CRS 
28147 0.042 0.200 0 1  
Total CRS score 1174 1607.6 645.7 505 5315  
ln(payroll) 28147 8.564 2.918 0.693 20.992 12.91*** 
PropTax 28147 2705.011 95276.27 0 7898700 13000.42*** 
FlowCapital 28147 718.134 9808.715 0 729485 5554.70*** 
HousingValue 28147 10.879 0.441 9.461 13.122 11.19*** 
HHincome 28147 10.168 0.248 8.995 11.035 10.28*** 
YearBuilt 28147 1961.437 12.128 1714.127 1982.388 1961.30*** 
RentShare 28147 0.275 0.0728 0.117 0.839 0.32*** 
StayShare 28147 0.535 0.0773 0.217 0.783 0.46*** 
CollegeShare 28147 0.142 0.0627 0.034 0.505 0.18*** 
noHSshare 28147 0.261 0.082 0.053 0.665 0.23*** 
WhiteShare 28147 0.876 0.150 0.024 1 0.79*** 
ChildShare 28147 0.270 0.034 0.122 0.460 0.25*** 
Ruralness 28147 4.526 2.919 0 9 2.29*** 
Humidity 28147 56.781 12.200 14 80 59.36 
Topography 28147 7.706 6.209 1 21 7.67*** 
Plains 28147 0.603 0.486 0 1 0.61 
WaterShare 28147 4.874 11.465 0 75 11.91*** 
WaterTopo 28147 27.956 71.913 0 1200 44.13*** 
WetPlains 28147 35.532 29.435 0 80 40.08*** 
WetTopo 28147 418.173 352.102 28 1580 384.91 
Floodrisk 28147 87.194 12.753 19 99 91.02*** 
Note: a This column contains the mean values of the independent variables for communities participating 
in CRS. 
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Table 5. Logistic regression results 
Models Logistic 
Regression 
 Coefficient 
Variables 
(Robust Std. 
Err.) 
Variables  
ln(payroll) .680 ***   
(.021) 
PropTax -8.33e-06***     
(2.92e-06)     
FlowCapital .0000133                  
(9.25e-06)      
HousingValue .934***                 
(.202)      
HHincome  -3.123***             
(.394) 
YearBuilt .014***                 
(.005)      
RentShare -4.634***             
(.789)     
StayShare -4.641***            
(.799)   
CollegeShare 1.651           
(1.033)      
noHSshare -7.126***         
(1.042)     
WhiteShare -1.737***           
(.417)     
ChildShare -3.976***           
(1.324)     
Ruralness -.051**          
(.023)     
Humidity .023*          
 (.012)      
Topography .145***          
 (.040)      
WaterShare .032***           
(.004)      
Plains -1.067***          
(.717)     
WaterTopo -.005***           
(.001)     
WetPlains  .026**         
(.012)      
WetTopo -.002***          
(.001)     
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Floodrisk .011***    
(.004)      
Constant -10.919   
(11.068)     
Observations 28,140 Note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. 
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Table 6. Tobit regression and Cragg’s double hurdle results 
Models Tobit 
Regression 
Cragg Double Hurdle 
Variables Coefficient  
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
  Participation Score 
ln(payroll) 713.972*** 
(25.365) 
.331***    
(.010)     
17.981   
(11.240)      
PropTax -.0113*** 
(.003) 
-4.72e-06***     
(1.26e-06)     
-.006***    
(.001)     
FlowCapital .0263***                 
(.007)      
.0000105***     
(3.46e-06) 
.0202***    
(.003)      
HousingValue 908.905***      
(200.014)      
.440***    
(.094)      
-223.871**   
(99.463)     
HHincome -3180.822***     
(430.569)     
-1.512***    
(.201)    
28.269   
(216.681)      
YearBuilt 8.917***     
(3.341)      
.005***    
(.002)      
-.988    
(1.480)     
RentShare -5298.117***     
(822.932)     
-2.416***    
(.385)     
-601.757   
(419.568)     
StayShare -5746.344***     
(818.210)     
-2.54***    
(.380)     
-1051.359**   
(436.063)     
CollegeShare 2491.044**    
(1114.827)      
.937*   
(.529)      
1091.935**   
(540.595)      
noHSshare -6894.933***     
(1164.905)     
-3.386***    
(.542)     
-337.131   
(648.052)     
WhiteShare -1663.979***     
(463.056)     
-.755***    
(.216) 
-151.530   
(256.007)     
ChildShare -3518.382**    
(1420.085)     
-1.929***    
(.686)     
-902.743   
(630.078)     
Ruralness -60.716**    
(23.642)     
-.022**   
(.011)     
-50.417***    
(11.732)     
Humidity 25.012**    
(12.693)      
.0127**   
(.006)      
-8.596    
(6.166)     
Topography 162.558***     
(41.302)      
.0763***    
(.020)      
1.330    
(19.278)      
WaterShare 32.204***     
(3.657)      
.015***    
(.002)      
2.229   
(1.653)      
Plains -1273.389*    
(716.677)     
-.667*     
(.341)     
39.230   
(328.808)      
WaterTopo -4.289***     
(.665)     
-.002***     
(.000313)     
-.189    
(.271)     
WetPlains 31.466**    
(12.397)      
.0151**    
(.006)      
5.824    
(5.912)      
WetTopo -2.308***    
(.734)     
-.001***     
(.000346)     
.231    
(.352)      
Floodrisk 11.645***     
(4.010)      
.005***    
(.002)      
1.881    
(1.969)      
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Constant -1524.012    
(7327.397)     
-2.192    
(3.507)     
6446.719   
(3210.868)      
Observations 28,140 28,140 28,140 Note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. 
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